Dear Chief Jibrin Samuel Okutepa, SAN,
I read your write up with more amusement than anger. In other to portray yourself as a victim of political oppression and witch-hunt, you accused me of abuse of office, forgery and indeed, professional misconduct. Nothing can be farther from the truth.
I would ordinarily have ignored your post but for the fear that your misleading public narrative may be believed and thereby portray me as one guilty of your allegations. You will therefore understand why I have to respond to you in the same medium you have accused me.
The petition to the LPDC is not about whether Chief Okutepa had the right to accept a brief or challenge the constitution of the Electoral Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association (ECNBA). That right is unquestionable and firmly rooted in our adversarial system.
The issue, rather, concerns the manner in which that right was exercised and whether, in the course of doing so, the ethical obligations owed to the court, particularly in ex parte proceedings, were fully observed.
Contrary to the narrative being advanced, the petition is neither personal nor retaliatory. It arises from what appears to be a serious professional concern deserving examination by the appropriate disciplinary body.
The focus is not on representation, but on the circumstances surrounding Suit No. I/221/2026 and the procurement of far-reaching ex parte orders affecting the electoral process of the Association.
It is not disputed that the ECNBA was constituted at the National Executive Committee meeting held in Benin.
The records of the meeting indicate that, following deliberations, a motion for the constitution of the ECNBA was formally moved by Chief Richard Oma Ahonaruogho, SAN, seconded by Mr. Clever N. Owhor, and adopted by NEC. Chief Okutepa, SAN, was present throughout the proceedings and actively participated in the meeting, including presenting the report and communiqué of the Security Ad-hoc Committee which he chaired shortly after the ratification of the ECNBA.
This procedure of presentation, motion, seconding, and adoption, reflects the established practice of NEC. A communiqué issued immediately after the meeting also reflected, among other resolutions, the constitution of the ECNBA.
That communiqué circulated widely within the Bar and remained unchallenged. No objection was raised by those present, including Chief Okutepa, SAN, regarding the accuracy of the communiqué or the fact of the ECNBA’s constitution.
In addition, video recordings of the NEC proceedings capture the deliberations leading to the constitution of the ECNBA, including the motion, the seconding, and the adoption.
The recordings also show that Chief Okutepa, SAN, was present in the hall during these proceedings. These materials underscore the importance of examining whether all material facts known to counsel were disclosed when the ex parte orders were sought.
The concern is further heightened by the reliance on minutes which allegedly did not reflect the full proceedings of the meeting, particularly the motion and adoption of the ECNBA.
The ex parte application was prosecuted without disclosure of the material fact that both lead counsel and the first claimant were present at the meeting where the committee was constituted.
Interim orders were thereafter granted restraining the ECNBA from functioning, thereby affecting the electoral process of the Association.
This raises an important professional question: where counsel personally witnessed the constitution of a body through a motion duly moved and seconded, and where a communiqué issued immediately thereafter reflected that decision without objection, does the failure to disclose those facts in an ex parte application not call for scrutiny?
Would reliance on minutes that allegedly did not capture the full proceedings, particularly in the face of video evidence and an unchallenged communiqué, not raise legitimate concerns regarding the duty of candour owed to the court?
The Rules of Professional Conduct impose a clear duty in this regard. A lawyer is not permitted to rely solely on client instructions where he knows, or ought reasonably to know, that material facts are being withheld or misrepresented.
The obligation is even stricter in ex parte proceedings, where the court depends entirely on the utmost good faith of counsel. Any omission of material facts, whether deliberate or reckless, goes directly to the integrity of the judicial process.
It is therefore incorrect to frame the petition as intimidation or victimisation. The LPDC exists precisely to examine allegations of professional misconduct. Submitting a petition to that body is the invocation of a lawful accountability mechanism. Whether the petition succeeds or fails is a matter for determination on evidence, not public sentiment.
Permit me to note that the assertion that I lobbied for Chief Okutepa’s exclusion from the Body of Benchers is misconceived. The NBA merely exercised its discretion not to recommend his renewal in light of the pending petition before the LPDC.
It would have been inconsistent for the Association to recommend for re-appointment to a body of the highest distinction in the profession a person whose conduct it had simultaneously referred for disciplinary scrutiny. Recommendations for renewal are discretionary and may legitimately take prevailing circumstances into account.
This matter is not about personalities. It is about preserving professional ethics, particularly where ex parte orders are invoked in circumstances capable of affecting the electoral process of the Association.
The petition seeks clarification on the extent to which a lawyer may rely on client instructions where material facts known to counsel are not disclosed, and the scope of the duty of candour under Rule 24(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The issues raised are properly for determination by the disciplinary process. The LPDC is not a political arena but a quasi-judicial body guided by rules, evidence, and precedent. If there is a defence to the allegations, it will find its strength there.
The petition is therefore an institutional step taken in good faith. It is not a personal attack. It is not a political contest.
It is a professional inquiry into whether the procurement of ex parte orders, in the circumstances presented, complied with the ethical standards expected of legal practitioners.
The determination of these issues should properly lie with the disciplinary process, not in the arena of public debate.
Mazi Afam Osigwe, SAN
President,
Nigerian Bar Association
