Supreme Court’s Electoral Act Ruling Does Not Automatically Disqualify Candidates

Senior Advocate of Nigeria and legal practitioner, Dr. M. O. Ubani, SAN, has cautioned against interpretations suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in INEC v. Zenith Labour Party automatically disqualifies candidates already nominated and published by the Independent National Electoral Commission.

In a detailed legal intervention on the judgment, Ubani said the apex court’s decision restored the validity of Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, but stressed that the restoration of those provisions is different from a judicial determination on the validity of an individual candidate’s nomination. Pasted text

According to him, political parties are once again required to comply with statutory rules governing membership registers and the recognised methods of nominating candidates. However, he argued that the Supreme Court did not issue a blanket order disqualifying persons who were not parties to the litigation.

Ubani said questions surrounding any particular candidate must still be resolved on the facts of the nomination process, the applicable statutory procedure and the right of affected persons to fair hearing.

He drew particular attention to Sections 29, 33 and 88 of the Electoral Act 2026, arguing that the legislation itself provides specific judicial mechanisms for challenging nominations and determining whether a candidate should be disqualified or excluded from an election. Pasted text

Under Section 29, he explained, a participating aspirant may approach the Federal High Court where there are reasonable grounds to challenge information supplied by a candidate concerning constitutional eligibility.

He further noted that Section 88 allows an aspirant who participated in a primary to challenge alleged non-compliance with the Electoral Act or a political party’s guidelines, while the consequence of exclusion follows only where a court makes the necessary finding. Pasted text

Ubani also relied on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC & 2 Ors (No. 2) to support the position that INEC does not have an unrestricted power to unilaterally disqualify a candidate after the candidate’s name has been forwarded to the Commission. Pasted text

14-Day Limitation Period Remains Critical

The senior lawyer identified the constitutional limitation period for pre-election cases as one of the most important issues likely to arise from the judgment.

Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution requires every pre-election matter to be commenced within 14 days from the date of the event, decision or action complained of.

Ubani explained that the precise date on which a cause of action arose could determine whether a challenge remains legally sustainable.

For instance, where the complaint concerns a candidate’s eligibility to participate in a primary because the candidate’s name allegedly did not appear in the statutory membership register, the relevant event may be the primary itself.

On the other hand, where the complaint specifically concerns a subsequent act or decision by INEC, that later action may, depending on the facts and relief sought, create a separate cause of action. Pasted text

Pending Cases Not Automatically Terminated

Ubani also addressed the implications of the Supreme Court judgment for cases already pending before lower courts.

He said such cases do not automatically disappear simply because the Supreme Court has reversed the legal position previously adopted by the Court of Appeal.

Rather, lower courts are now bound to apply the restored provisions as valid law while still examining the facts of each pending dispute.

Among the questions a court may still have to determine are whether the affected candidate was actually on the relevant party register, whether the claimant was a qualified aspirant, whether the action was filed within the constitutional limitation period and whether the relief sought is one permitted by the Electoral Act. Pasted text

INEC Cannot Simply Remove Published Candidates

Ubani further cautioned against the view that the Supreme Court ruling gives INEC an automatic administrative power to remove candidates whose names have already been published.

He argued that while INEC must administer and enforce the Electoral Act within its statutory powers, the disqualification or exclusion of an identified candidate ordinarily requires the judicial procedures expressly provided by the law.

He noted that Sections 29(6) and 88(3) contemplate court findings before the consequential disqualification or exclusion of a candidate.

Section 33, he added, also restricts the substitution of candidates already submitted to INEC to the circumstances prescribed by law, principally death or withdrawal. Pasted text

Three Key Takeaways

Ubani distilled the implications of the judgment into three principal points.

First, the Supreme Court has restored the validity of Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026.

Second, the restoration of those provisions does not automatically determine whether every individual nomination already conducted is valid or invalid.

Third, the Electoral Act provides judicial procedures through which disputes concerning the qualification, nomination or exclusion of particular candidates must be determined. Pasted text

He concluded that the critical questions in any nomination dispute would now include when the cause of action arose, whether the claimant had locus standi, whether the action was filed within 14 days, the nature of the alleged non-compliance and whether the relief sought is one that can be granted by INEC or only by a competent court.

“The Supreme Court has restored the law,” Ubani argued, adding that it is now for competent courts, where properly approached, to determine the consequential rights of individual candidates on the facts of each case. Pasted text

Dr. M. O. Ubani, SAN, is a legal practitioner and policy analyst.
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